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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE JACKSON/IDEALIST PROGRAMME

Annex:- 'A' Staging for operations in the Middle East [redacted]
'B' Staging for operations in South East Asia [redacted]
'C' Staging for operations over Indonesia.
'D' Radii of action from selected bases. [redacted]
'E' Logistic Requirements. [redacted]
(F) [redacted]

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it is intended to highlight the present lack of integration within the Jackson/Idealist programme at the operational levels and to point out the requirement for a joint approach to the problem of future utilization of the capability. Secondly, it is intended as a means of presenting to Headquarters Churn, in an acceptable form, the various operational considerations inherent in the mounting of Jackson/Idealist missions.

So that the information may be presented in a logical pattern it has been necessary to assume various hypothetical areas for future operation. Assumptions have been made also with regard to the likely period of operational liability

AREAS OF INTEREST

3. The following areas have been selected as being of possible mutual interest for future operations:-

(a) The Middle East. The area of the Middle East including specifically Iraq, Iran, [redacted] and the [redacted] 25X6 25X6

(b) South East Asia. The general area of South East Asia including specifically Laos, North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma and Thailand.

(c) Indonesia.

OPERATIONS LIABILITY PERIOD

4. In order to provide typical details for the deployment, staging and logistic requirements, the problem has been examined so as to cover two separate types of operation:-

(a) Deployment to a forward base of one aircraft and two pilots with the intention of mounting one mission followed by subsequent rapid withdrawal.

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(b) Deployment to a forward base of two aircraft and four pilots with the intention of mounting ten missions during a thirty-day period.

JUSTIFICATION FOR A JOINT APPROACH

5. The Headquarters Idealist concept of operations includes the 'fast move' for staging to a forward base. The main reasons for this are:-

(a) Security.

(b) Aircraft Serviceability.

(c) Possible limited political clearance or agreement for the use of a particular staging base.

6. In order to achieve this fast move concept whilst keeping pilot fatigue down to an acceptable level, it has been found necessary to position one pilot, for each aircraft, at each staging base en route to the forward base. Reference to the staging examples at Annex's A,B & C will show that there are invariably at least two stagings involved. The penalty for this in terms of pilots required is considerable and the following points become self evident:-

(a) It will not be practicable to employ the fast move concept using Jackson pilots alone.

(b) Now that Detachment 'G' has been reduced to an effective strength of six pilots it may be necessary, at least for certain areas of operation, to use Jackson pilots for ferrying on Idealist operations.

7. The foregoing paragraphs point to the logical solution to the operational problem, namely, a joint integrated programme based upon the following three types of activity:-

(a) A mission or missions which for political considerations may be flown only by Idealist pilots but for which Jackson pilots may participate in the staging.

(b) A mission or missions which for political considerations may be flown only by Jackson pilots but for which Idealist pilots may participate in the staging.

(c) Joint missions for which there is full integration of Jackson/Idealist pilots in those areas where this is politically acceptable.

8. In order to implement a joint programme of this nature a much closer working liason would be necessary at all levels and particularly at the operational levels, than is in effect at the present time. The re-introduction of the Idealist/Jackson reporting procedures would also be a pre-requisite.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING CAPABILITY

9. The J.75 Engine. Detachment 'G' now has two aircraft fitted 25X1A2g with the J.75 engine [redacted]. There will be a total of five aircraft so fitted by about March, 1962.

10. Performance. The following are some realistic planning figures for aircraft with full fuel load. They serve to highlight the 25X1A2g essential differences in performance between the [redacted]

25X1A2g (a) [redacted] Initial level out at 62,500' after 35 minutes, reaching 70,000' when 200 gallons fuel remain. T.A.S:- 415 Knots. Range:- 3,900 Nautical miles.

25X1A2g (b) [redacted] Initial level out at 66,700' after 35 minutes, reaching 70,000' after 3 hours 12 minutes. T.A.S:- 395 Knots. Range:- 3,400 Nautical miles.

25X1A2g (c) When flying for range the [redacted] cruises at 70,000'. However, it can reach [redacted] after 25X1D 5 hours and cruises at that altitude for a total distance of 3,240 nautical miles at which point there will be 100 gallons of fuel remaining.

25X1A2g (d) The maximum altitude profile for the [redacted] reaches 25X1D [redacted] with 200 gallons of fuel remaining after 7 hours. Range is 3,060 nautical miles to 100 gallons remaining.

11. Tactical Concept. The present concept is that except for missions in those areas where the known defences are of little consequence, or where contrails do not constitute a serious problem, that penetration of denied areas will be made, invariably, at altitudes around 70,000'. Altitudes of 70,000' [redacted] will be 25X1D maintained at all times whilst over denied territory. Missions that are planned to conform with this requirement will usually suffer a reduction in range capability; this is accepted in the interests of tactical expedience.

25X1A2g 12. In-Flight Refuelling. Detachment 'G' now has one [redacted] fitted 25X1A2g for I.F.R. There will be a second [redacted] so fitted by December, 1961. In-flight trials have been completed successfully and it is hoped to start pilot training on the Unit in the near future. It is expected that only a certain number, probably some fifty-percent of the pilots in the Unit will be checked out in I.F.R.

BASES

13. The suitability of bases from which to operate in the areas under review has been considered in the light of:-

(a) Possible radius of action.

(b) Security of use.

(c) Possible approval for use in the project.

(d) Facilities.

25X1C8a The accent has been placed on the use of [redacted] bases as it appears that for the areas of the world under review such bases are eminently suitable.

The Middle East.

25X1C8a 25X1A6a 14. [redacted] base at [redacted] is the most suitable in the Middle East area. It is located in a sparsely populated area well away from towns and the problem of foreign labour on the airfield is at a minimum. The resources in terms of housing, feeding, technical accommodation and storage facilities are adequate and the runway is excellent. It is well situated for coverage of the areas of interest; reference to the radius of action charts at Annex 'D' will make this point clear.

25X1X4 25X1A6a 25X1A6a 25X1C8a 25X1A6a 15. [redacted] target area can be covered from [redacted] direct, but if necessary, [redacted] is available for staging or emergency. The [redacted] bases at [redacted] are available from which to stage for certain areas of Iraq and Iran. However, these two bases, although suitable for staging, have only natural runway surfaces and this would probably preclude their use for a prolonged operation.

South East Asia.

25X1X4 25X1A6a 25X1C8a 25X1C8a 25X1A2g 25X1A6a 16. The entire area of interest in South East Asia, including [redacted], can be covered from two bases, [redacted] The former is a [redacted] base and it has all the necessary facilities, the latter is a joint [redacted]/Civil operated airfield which is suitable in all other respects. It is of interest to note that [redacted] of Strategic Air Command have been operating from [redacted] Bases during recent months in an overt operation; this fact could be useful in formulating the cover story.

Alternatives.

25X1C8a 25X1C 17. If the use of [redacted] bases as outlined in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 is unacceptable, the only alternatives envisaged at this time are the United States bases at Adana and [redacted] Neither of these two bases is considered to be as suitable in all respects as those already proposed.

Radius of Action

18. Radius of action circles for all of these bases are at Annex 'D'. The circles are all based on 1000' miles; this can be extended depending upon the amount of time to be spent on photography on a particular mission. The safe maximum planning figure is for a round trip of 3,400 nautical miles with the [redacted], this reduces to 3,060 nautical miles if maximum altitude cruise is required for tactical reasons. See paragraph 10.

25X1A2g

25X1C8a [redacted] Some Special Considerations

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19. General. The logistic problem, including the prepositioning of fuel is largely the same whether a United States or [redacted] base is used, however, there are bound to be certain administrative and security matters which will require detailed examination; it is not anticipated that any of these problems will be difficult to resolve.

20. Communications. The provision of an adequate communications system is vital for this operation. In the Middle East area it is anticipated that adequate facilities can be provided by positioning CW staging kits at the base or bases concerned and by utilizing existing communications networks. However, the Far East area poses a more difficult problem because of the distances involved and the various deleterious tropical effects on radio transmissions. The positioning of suitably powered CW radio facilities may be required at the operational bases. When approval in principle for the use of these bases has been given it will be necessary to study the communication problem in detail with all the information on existing channels of communication available.

21. For planning purposes it should be assumed that, particularly in the Far East, a period of up to two months prior to deployment may be required in order to set up adequate communications.

PROCESSING FACILITIES

22. Unless there is an urgent requirement for interpretation of photography, it is assumed that the film would be sent to the United States for processing so that advantage may be taken of those facilities which afford the maximum quality of production. However,

25X1D [redacted] 25X1D

Both of these units are operated by the Strategic Air Command.

September, 1961.